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I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Federal Constitution considered trial by jury to
be so important to individual liberty that they enshrined the right in no
fewer than three provisions1 (four if you count the Fifth Amendment
Grand Jury Clause2):
†

Dr. Roger Roots, J.D., Ph.D. is on the Advisory Board of the Fully Informed Jury
Association (FIJA) and the American Jury Institute, based in Helena, Montana. A
version of this paper was presented as an address before the National Libertarian Party
Convention in Denver, Colorado on May 24, 2008.
1 See AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION & RECONSTRUCTION 83
(1998); U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal
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The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed. U.S. Constitution, Article
III, Section 2.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district where in the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . . U.S.
Constitution, Sixth Amendment.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law. U.S. Constitution, Seventh
Amendment.

Juries “were at the heart of the Bill of Rights” in 1791.3 Indeed, as
Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar recounts, the entire debate at the
Philadelphia convention over the necessity of a bill of rights “was
triggered when George Mason [mentioned] . . . that ‘no provision was
yet made for juries in civil cases.’”4 Jury trial was so important to the
ratification of the Constitution that five of six states that advanced
amendments during their ratifying conventions included two or more
jury-related proposals.5 Indeed, the only right secured in all state
constitutions penned between 1776 and 1787 was the right to jury trial in
criminal cases.6

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“the right of trial by jury [in civil cases]
shall be preserved . . .”).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .”).
3 Amar, supra note 1, at 83. Many thanks are owed to the scholarship of Professor
Amar on this subject. I have criticized Amar’s conclusions on Fourth Amendment law
extensively in another article. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ L. REV. 1 (2009). However, I regard Amar’s
research into the original intent behind the jury trial provisions of the Constitution as
extremely insightful. I highly recommend Amar’s THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION &
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (but not for its claims regarding the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule).
4 Amar, supra note 1, at 83.
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985)).
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It can even be said that infringement upon the right to jury trial
instigated the American Revolution.7 The Declaration of Independence
condemned the Crown for “depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits
of trial by jury” and “transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for
pretended offenses,” while protecting government officials “by a mock
Trial” (i.e., without local juries) for murders they committed against the
colonists.8 The earlier revolutionary documents, such as the 1774
Declaration of Rights of the First Continental Congress and 1775
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms,9 also
invoked the denial of trial by jury as foremost among the grievances of
the American colonists.10 John Adams’ Braintree, Massachusetts
Resolutions against the Stamp Act exclaimed that, “In [the admiralty
courts hearing Stamp-Act prosecutions], one Judge presides alone!” and
“No Juries have any Concern there!”11
According to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, the British
Crown’s various efforts to deprive British subjects’ right to jury trial
between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries may even have caused
the colonization of North America by embittered Englishmen during that
period.12 Thus, wrote Black, the denial of jury trial “led first to the
colonization of this country, later to the war that won its independence,
and, finally to the Bill of Rights.”13
II. THE PRESENT-DAY JURY IS A “SHADOW OF ITS FORMER SELF”
But the high regard in which the Framers held the right to jury trial
has not been passed down to contemporary policymakers. The jury trial
provisions of the Constitution—provisions which the Founders fought a
bloody eight-year war against their own government to reestablish—have
been increasingly marginalized and rendered impotent by the precedents
7 See, e.g., ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006) (detailing the American colonists’
outrage at Parliament’s enactments creating vice admiralty courts to adjudicate cases
stemming from the Crown’s increasingly draconian enactments).
8 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).
9 See Amar, supra note 1, at 83 (citing the 1774 Declaration of Rights of the First
Continental Congress (“the respective colonies are entitled to . . . the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage”), and the 1775
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (invoking the “inestimable
privilege of trial by jury”)).
10 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 139–40 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (recounting
the history of the colonists’ promotion of the right to jury trial).
11 JACK N. RACKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND THE IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 303 (1996) (reprinting excepts from Adams’ exclamations).
12 Cohen, 366 U.S. at 139–40 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
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underpinning contemporary American criminal procedure. As Amar
writes, “the present-day jury is only a shadow of its former self.”14
Today the right to jury trial has been (1) eliminated in the vast majority
of criminal cases due to the ubiquitous practice of plea bargaining (which
was unknown to the Framers of the original Constitution), (2)
marginalized by confinement to only cases exposing defendants to more
than six months imprisonment (a proposition at odds with the plain
language of the Constitution),15 and (3) increasingly controlled through
the elimination of juries of the vicinage, as federal trial practice has
moved more federal criminal litigation into the largest metropolitan
centers of federal court districts.16
14

Amar, supra note 1, at 97.
The same trend that stripped the jury of its law-reviewing power has also led to the
creation of the so-called “petty offense” exception. The Constitution’s Framers intended
that the government must submit all criminal prosecutions to jury trials. The petty
offense exception to the right to trial by jury was spawned as dicta in an 1888 opinion of
the Supreme Court. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888) (holding that a
charge of criminal conspiracy triggered the constitutional right to jury trial but lesser
crimes might not). Supreme Court rulings since the end of the 1800s have confined the
right to jury trial to cases of only “serious” rather than “petty” crimes (i.e., punishable by
less than six months imprisonment). See id. at 542. Despite the Sixth Amendment’s
clear language (“all criminal prosecutions”), the Supreme Court held that the guarantee
does not apply to “petty offenses,” meaning crimes punishable by less than sixth months.
See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). Even a fine of $5,000 in
conjunction with a possible six-month jail sentence was held not serious enough to
warrant the expense of the right to trial by jury. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1,
5–6 (1993). This distinction exists nowhere in constitutional text, which explicitly
guarantees a jury trial “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth Amendment and for
“all crimes” in Article III, Section 2. Justices Black and Douglas observed in a 1970
concurrence that the Supreme Court, “without the necessity of an amendment . . . decided
that ‘all crimes’ did not mean ‘all crimes,’ but meant only ‘all serious crimes.’” Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring). Black and Douglas
observed that the Court’s lax treatment of the Constitution’s plain language was for the
government’s benefit only: “This decision is reached by weighing the advantages to the
defendant against the administrative inconvenience to the State inherent in a jury trial and
magically concluding that the scale tips at six months imprisonment.” Id. “Those who
wrote and adopted our Constitution and Bill of Rights engaged in all the balancing
necessary . . . . They decided that the value of a jury trial far outweighed its costs for “all
crimes” and “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.” Id. The abandonment of the Constitution’s
plain language represented “little more than judicial mutilation of our written
Constitution.” Id. Because misdemeanor prosecutions outnumber felony prosecutions in
most American courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has stripped the right to
jury trial from the majority of criminal cases.
16 A detailed treatment of this topic would require a wholly separate article. Since
1966, federal criminal procedure has allowed the federal criminal justice system to
consolidate federal litigation at large, mostly-urban centers within large geographic court
districts. In practice, this has meant that many rural defendants are made to defend
themselves in distant metropolitan areas and are tried before more urban juries drawn
from areas where the alleged offense is not alleged to have occurred. I have litigated a
couple of cases challenging this practice (e.g., United States v. Stanko, 528 F.3d 581, 582
15
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But by far the most profound limitation placed upon jury trials by
modern practice involves the transformation of jurors from deciders of
both the law and the facts into mere evaluators of facts. This seemingly
subtle change has wrought drastic ramifications upon the development of
the law during the past century.17 Indeed, it may be said that the
elimination of the jury’s traditional lawfinding role has paved the way
for a wholesale enlargement of government in American personal affairs.
Today’s gargantuan criminal justice landscape, with its hundreds of
penal institutions and expansive offender registries, could not have been
possible but for the jury’s decreased role as a check on the power of the
state. And because juries are no longer allowed to openly cast votes
against bad laws, the criminal codes of every American jurisdiction have
exploded in length, triviality, and complexity.
As American history has progressed, Americans have looked with
increasing trust toward the courts—especially the U.S. Supreme Court—
as a primary protector of their constitutional liberties. This trust has been
mostly betrayed.18 Moreover, even a cursory review of the original
meanings behind the Constitution’s jury provisions reveals that such trust
in judges was never intended by the drafters of the Constitution.
The Framers viewed judges as equals to laymen with regard to
knowledge of the law.19 Common citizens of early America were known
to have been highly interested in and knowledgeable about legal issues.

(8th Cir. 2008)) and presented papers on this topic at academic meetings. Some day in
the future I hope to author an in-depth review of this topic.
17 This article emphasizes the changes imposed upon the criminal law by the modern
trend of no-nullification jury instructions. It must also be said that the Seventh
Amendment’s protection of the right to jury trial in civil cases has also been truncated
and limited in ways not intended by the Framers. Consider tax cases, where judges have
ruled that defendants are not entitled to jury trials because tax cases were litigated in nonjury chancery courts at the time of the founding. However, there were many voices of the
framing era who demanded jury trials in tax cases and interpreted the Seventh
Amendment as protecting a jury trial right in such cases. See Alan H. Scheiner, Judicial
Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury
Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 145–55 (1991) (citing founding-era sources which called
for the right to jury trials in tax, asset forfeiture and other civil cases).
18 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 57 (1989) (stating the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favored the government); Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of
Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69–
72 (2005) (demonstrating the Supreme Court’s bias in favor of the government in
criminal cases).
19 It has been largely forgotten that the colonial judges known to the Founding
generation were no more educated in the law than their contemporary fellows they met
while strolling the streets. See Rackove, supra note 11, at 299 (“[F]ew justices brought
anything resembling legal expertise to their duties . . . . legal expertise was irrelevant to
many of the routine duties of courts”).
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Nearly 2,500 copies of Blackstone’s Commentaries were sold in the
colonies in the ten years prior to the Revolution.20 Edmund Burke
famously stated that “[i]n no other country perhaps in the world is the
law so general a study.”21 Many American court systems did not even
require that judges be lawyers. 22 “In several jurisdictions, lay judges
presided in the courts long beyond the revolutionary period.”23 A
blacksmith served on the highest court in Rhode Island from 1814 to
1818.24 The chief justice of the same court from 1818 to 1826 was a
farmer.25 In New Hampshire, ministers, merchants, and farmers served
on the state supreme court in the early years of the Republic.26
Early colonial judges worked mostly as administrators, providing a
wide variety of clerical and routine municipal duties. According to Jack
Rackove, one of the foremost authorities on the original intent of the
Constitution:
When courts exercised their properly judicial (as opposed to
administrative) functions, the decision-makers were juries. The
most striking feature of colonial justice was the bare modicum of
authority that judges actually exercised. “Americans of the
prerevolutionary period expected their judges to be automatons
who mechanically applied immutable rules of law to the facts of
each case . . . . The competence of the jury extended to matters of
law and fact alike, and juries used this authority freely. In cases
tried before panels of judges, a jury might hear multiple
explanations of the relevant law from judges speaking seriatim,
as well as from the rival attorneys. It was then free to decide the
case on any basis it chose, and though appeals could be taken
from its decision, the devices that English judges could use to set
unreasonable jury verdicts aside were left largely untapped in
America. Only rarely were colonial juries limited to reaching
special verdicts in which they decided narrow questions of fact,
20 See F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1760-1766
8 (1966).
21 Id.
22 The very notion that law and the courts are the domain of professional lawyers was
alien to the founding generation, who sometimes viewed the “practice of law” by
attorneys with derision and contempt. See, e.g., KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, THE POLITICALLY
INCORRECT GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 49 (2007); see also The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L. J. 172 (1964) (“Underlying the conception of
the jury as a bulwark against the unjust use of governmental power were the distrust of
‘legal experts’ and a faith in the ability of the common people”).
23 See Jeffrey R. Pankratz, NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE RIGHT TO NEUTRAL ACCESS
TO THE COURTS, 67 IND. L.J. 1091, 1103 n.70 (1992).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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leaving the legal consequences of their findings to the bench; far
more often they rendered general verdicts resolving questions of
law and fact at once.27

Even more significantly, judges were viewed as inherently
suspicious.28 Judges were identified as being aligned with the intrusive
state, and unlikely to challenge other government officials.29 “Judges,
unincumbered by juries,” wrote An Old Whig, one of the Federalist
Papers contributors, in 1787, “have been ever found much better friends
to government than to the people. Such judges will always be more
desirable than juries to . . . those who wish to enslave the people . . . .”30
“A Democratic Federalist,” another pseudonymous writer in 1787, wrote
that “a lordly court of justice, [is] always ready to protect the officers of
government against the weak and helpless citizen.”31
Corrupt and government-supremacist judges had been among the
major grievances of the American Revolutionaries, and the court
practices of early America had enshrined the Founders’ general suspicion
and distrust of judges as much as of government generally.32 “In ten of
the thirteen colonies, the sitting chief justice or his equivalent ultimately
chose George III over George Washington” during the Revolution.33
27

Rackove, supra note 11, at 300 (emphasis added).
There was widespread disdain and contempt for lawyers throughout the American
colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Pankratz, supra note 23, at 1103
(writing of “a general hostility toward the legal profession” in early America). Pankratz
quotes a founding-era anti-federalist, Benjamin Austin, as speaking of “a danger of
lawyers becoming formidable as a combined body.” Id. If this danger were not checked,
said Austin, lawyers “might subvert every principle of law and establish a perfect
aristocracy.” Id.
29 See Rackove, supra note 11, at 298 (discussing Founders’ view that “as members
of a cohesive ruling elite, judges were unlikely to challenge either Crown or
Parliament”); Alan H. Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 150 (1991) (saying
early Anti-federalists feared that judges “would tend to favor the prerogatives of the
executive branch”); see also State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, 21 (1849) (stating that the
principle reason for juries was the protection against “the consequences of the partiality
and undue bias of judges in favor of the prosecution”).
30 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 49 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (An Old Whig).
31 Id. at 61 (A Democratic Federalist).
32 The Framers intense distrust of government was registered on hundreds of
occasions and documents. See, e.g., letter from Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 20, 1787
reprinted in SAUL K. PADOVER, THE LIVING U.S. CONSTITUTION 29 (1953) (“energetic
government . . . is always oppressive”); Thomas Tredwell, statement at New York
Constitutional Convention, June 1788, reprinted ibid. at 20 (“government is like a mad
horse,” and only “a mad man [who] deserve[s] to have his neck broken . . . should trust
himself on this horse without any bridle at all”).
33 Akhil R. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 207 (2005) [hereafter,
“Amar II”].
28
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After the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson,
indiscriminately enforced provisions of the hated Stamp Act on
American colonists, he went home one evening to find his home had
been chopped to pieces by a hatchet-wielding mob.34 This and other
attacks on early Tory judges reflected an intense and widespread antijudge sentiment in early American law.35
III. JURY NULLIFICATION SUGGESTED FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The right to jury trial makes its entrance in the Constitution in
Article III, Section 2.36 Article III, laid out in only the barest of
framework,37 is the section of the Constitution that creates the federal
judiciary. Numerous scholars have suggested that the incongruous
placement of the right within Article III was intended to impose a
separation of powers in judicial adjudications similar to the division of
the legislative branch into two chambers.38 “Analogies between
legislatures and juries abounded” in the ratification debates.39 Juries
composed of the people were the “lower judicial bench” in a bicameral
judiciary, according to John Taylor, writing in 1814.40 As the “lower
judicial bench,” early jurors could both make and pass judgment on the
law. “The judicial structure,” noted Amar, “mirrored that of the
legislature, with an upper house of greater stability and experience and a
lower house to represent popular sentiment more directly.”41
The jury was to have an independent role of interpreting the
Constitution which was to rival that of the judiciary.42 One could easily

34 See IRA STOLL, SAMUEL ADAMS: A LIFE 42–44 (2008) (detailing the atmosphere
among colonial Bostonians during the period).
35 Notably, early Americans were not contemptuous of all judges. For example, they
named several American cities and towns after Lord Camden, the libertarian judge in
England whose rulings inspired generations of freedom-loving Americans. Camden,
New Jersey, for example, was named for Camden. Camden Yards, where the Baltimore
Orioles play baseball, is also named for Lord Camden. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
36 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury . . .”).
37 See, e.g., KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 49 (2007) (“What does the Constitution say about the courts? Not
much.”).
38 Amar, supra note 1, at 94.
39 Id.
40 See Amar, supra note 1, at 94 (referencing JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209 (W. Stark ed.,
1950 (1814)).
41 Amar, supra note 1, at 94.
42 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Response: On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1823, 1835 n.37 (1997):
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say that trial by jury was introduced in Article III as the most important
limitation on the judicial branch of government.43 The fact that only a
jury and not a judge could determine guilt reflected the Framers’ intent
that government operations against the populace be at the sufferance of
the people at large rather than by the wisdom or divine right of rulers.44
By contrast, there are no provisions in Article III, or anywhere in
the Constitution, that say that judges are to have the final power of
interpreting the law. Article III speaks only of “the judicial Power” and
says in Section 2 that juries—as much as or more than judges—wield
this power in the “trial of all crimes.”45 Indeed, both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists intended that judges would not be the final arbiters of
the meaning of laws. When Anti-Federalists criticized the proposed
Constitution for granting too much power to untrustworthy judges,46
Federalists insisted that the Constitution would do no such thing.47 In
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton assured critics that Article III would not
“suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power; it only
supposes that the power of the people is superior to both.”48
The jury’s true constitutional role—as a check on government
rather than a mere evaluator of evidence—can also be seen in the
centrality of jury power shown by the non-jury provisions of the Bill of
Rights.49 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, for
example, places in the jury’s hands the ability not only to nullify a law’s

Anyone who thinks that the Constitution designates the Supreme Court as
the final, definitive expositor of the Constitution simply has not read the
Constitution very carefully. The Supreme Court, through the Article III
Vesting Clause, has the power and duty to interpret the Constitution in the
course of resolving disputes, but that is a far cry from a power to fix the
Constitution’s meaning or to bind other interpreters (including future
Supreme Courts).
43 See Amar, supra note 1, at 94; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1174 (1971) reprinting clauses from Massachusetts Governor
John Hancock’s speech to the state legislature: indicating that the jury trial provisions of
the proposed Bill of Rights “appear to me to be of great consequence. In all free
governments, a share in the administration of the laws ought to be vested in, or reserved
to the people . . . .”).
44 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (“The right [to jury trial] includes,
of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge,
reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’”).
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
46 See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS (1999) (describing the intense
advocacy for fully informed juries among the Anti-Federalists).
47 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kranmick ed.,
1987).
48 Id.
49 Amar, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing the unstated centrality of the jury on the
First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments).

10

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:1

application but to effectively end the government’s prosecutorial attack
on a fellow countryman altogether. “[T]he hard core of the doublejeopardy clause is the absolute, unquestionable finality of a properly
instructed jury’s verdict of acquittal, even if this verdict is egregiously
erroneous in the eyes of judges.”50
The double-jeopardy clause has two major aspects: it not only stops
the government from pursuing another trial; it stops the legal system
itself—with all its wise and learned lawyers and judges, and its armed
bailiffs and marshals—from reconsidering the defendant’s “guilt” in any
appeal or appeal-like process.51 Thus, the jury represents a material
obstruction to the power of judges and other government authorities.
Theophilus Parsons, first Chief Justice of Massachusetts, explained
the power and eminence of juries this way in 1788:
[T]he people themselves have it in their power to resist
usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms. An act of
usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be
justified in his resistance. Let him be considered a criminal by
the general government, yet only his fellow citizens can convict
him; they are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all
the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly
will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of
usurpation.52

The intent that juries be empowered to nullify usurpatious laws is
also plainly indicated by the fact of the right to jury trial itself. Article
III, Section 2 clearly states that “[t]he trial of all crimes . . . shall be by
jury.”53 The Sixth Amendment commands that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . [to jury trial].”54 This
right applies even to cases where evidence of factual “guilt” is
overwhelming or unchallengeable.55 In a case where criminal acts are
recorded by a dozen surveillance cameras, or where a hundred neutral
and disinterested people saw the accused commit the crime, why offer
50

Id.
Id. at 97 (“If a properly instructed jury voted to convict, a judge could set aside the
conviction, but if that jury voted to acquit, reexamination was barred.”).
52 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 144 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (citing 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 94).
53 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
55 The Constitution includes “a right of the defendant to be given the chance to be
acquitted, even though such acquittal conflicts with both the facts and the judge’s
instructions on the law.” Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 168, 219 (1972).
51
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him a jury trial at all? Or when a criminal defendant openly admits
under oath on the witness stand that he committed every element of an
offense, why grant him the right to be acquitted by a jury at all?56
The answer lies in the Framer’s fundamental distrust of government
power, and ultimately, in the Framers’ intention that jurors act as buffers
between the government and their neighbors. The Framers saw the jury
as “the ultimate check against a tyrannical government.”57 By design,
any defendant is entitled to a chance to be acquitted by a jury even where
evidence of guilt is vast, insurmountable, and undisputed.58 As the
Supreme Court wrote in Gregg v. Georgia, any legal system that would
rob jurors of their discretion would be “totally alien to our notions of
criminal justice.”59
The U.S. Supreme Court, and virtually all the highest courts in
every state, has interpreted the right to jury trial to forbid special verdicts
that require jurors to describe the reasons for their verdicts or to provide
any information about their votes.60 This right of jurors to issue a
“general verdict”—a mysterious one- or two-word statement, with no
record or account of what grounds the verdict was based on, or the
degree of the jury’s agreement—flows from the right of juries to
deliberate in secret.61 Because no jury ever has to answer for its verdict
after rendering it, jury nullification survives in the face of all
governmental attempts to stamp it out. Juries have an inherent “veto
power” that can be brought into use to protect a member of their
community from any criminal prosecution.62

56 For two cases dealing with this scenario, see Mason v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d
856, 858 (Va. App. 1992); and Bryant v. Georgia, 296 S.E.2d 168, 169 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982).
57 Thomas P. Bruetsch, The Legislature “Caps” the Jury: Damage Caps and the
Michigan Constitution, 1 J.L. SOC’Y 151, 151 (1999).
58 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979) (“To be sure, the factfinder
in a criminal case has traditionally been permitted to enter an unassailable but
unreasonable verdict of ‘not guilty’. This is the logical corollary of the rule that there can
be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even if the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming.”).
59 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976).
60 See, e.g., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 910–11 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(describing the “judicial distaste” for special verdicts in criminal cases); United States v.
Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that criminal juries have a “general
veto power” and need never justify their decisions after the fact); United States v.
McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 418–19 (5th Cir. 1974) (collecting cases).
61 JOSEPH TOWERS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTY OF JURIES IN TRIALS FOR
LIBELS 32–33 (1785) (“English juries have been in possession, time immemorial, of the
right of giving a general verdict, of determining both the law and the fact, in every
criminal case brought before them.”).
62 Wilson, 629 F.2d at 443.
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IV. THE HISTORICAL LANDSCAPE OF JURY NULLIFICATION
All of this discussion yields the conclusion that the Constitution’s
Framers intended the provisions of the Constitution described above to
enshrine the absolute power of juries to acquit a factually guilty
defendant, and to determine both the law and the facts in jury trials. That
the Constitution’s Framers intended jury trial to represent a check on
government power rather than a mere fact-finding device is also
resoundingly clear from the historical record.63 Early precedents allowed
lawyers to make legal arguments to juries, and allowed juries to nullify
unjust laws.64 The only Supreme Court Justice ever impeached, Samuel
Chase, was impeached in part for giving a jury instruction suggesting a
jury must follow a judge’s instructions on the law.65
The Constitution’s Framers disagreed over many issues of criminal
procedure but were in uniform consensus that juries had constitutional
power to decide both the law and the facts in their final determinations.66
In Georgia v. Brailsford,67 the first jury trial ever held before the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay’s jury instruction stated plainly
that “you [the jury] have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to
judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy.”68 “[I]t is presumed, that juries are the best judges of fact; it
is, on the other hand, presumable, that the courts are the best judges of

63 This paper will not restate the English pre-Revolutionary underpinnings of trial by
jury, a long history ably recounted elsewhere. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY (1999). Associate U.S. Supreme
Court Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the right to jury trial was among the most
important natural rights recognized by the English colonists who came to America in the
1600s. The famed trial of printer William Bradford in colonial Pennsylvania in 1692
illustrates that colonial judges sometimes violated almost every other protection in the
zeal to convict dissidents, including denial of the prohibition against double jeopardy,
denial of speedy trial, denial of the right to know the charges, but nonetheless recognized
the right of jurors to judge both the law and the facts in criminal cases. See WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 55 (1954) (describing Bradford’s arguments with
the judge).
64 See, e.g., Stettinius v. United States, 5 D.C. (5 Cranch) 573 (D.C. Cir. 1839)
(allowing legal arguments to be made to the jury); United States v. Fenwick, 4 D.C. (4
Cranch) 675 (D.C. Cir. 1836) (sustaining the right to make legal arguments to the jury).
65 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
66 See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John
Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904 (1978) (“juries
rather than judges spoke the last word on law enforcement in nearly all, if not all, of the
eighteenth-century American colonies.”).
67 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
68 Id. at 4.
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the law. But still both objects are lawfully within your power of
decision.”69
Even a casual glance at the statements of the Framers regarding jury
independence yields a record that belies the later marginalization of
juries as mere citizen factfinders.70 The Founders viewed jurors as
participants in the political system no less than senators or congressional
representatives.71 Some Framers suggested the jury “could function like
a sitting constitutional convention, an authoritative interpreter of the
meaning of constitutional documents.”72 The Framers repeatedly spoke
of juries as playing a role of spoiler in the judicial branch, protecting
local citizens against arbitrary acts of government power.73
In The Complete Anti-Federalist, The Federal Farmer declared that
if judges tried to “subvert the laws, and change the forms of
government,” jurors had a right to “check them, by deciding against their
opinions and determinations.”74 “If the conduct of judges shall be severe
and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change the forms of
government,” the Federal Farmer continued, “the jury may check them,
by deciding against their opinions and determinations, in similar cases.”75
Tocqueville wrote in the 1830s that “[t]he jury is, above all, a political
[and not merely a judicial] institution . . . . The jury is that portion of the
nation to which the execution of the laws is entrusted, as the legislature is
that part of the nation which makes the laws.”76
“Jury nullification,” or rather, the right of jurors to check the power
of government by acquitting a factually “guilty” defendant, was
approved by all of America’s foremost founding fathers. Amar notes

69

Id.
See Nelson, supra note 66.
71 See Amar, supra note 1, at 94 (“Unable to harbor any realistic expectations of
serving in the small House of Representatives or the even more aristocratic Senate,
ordinary citizens could nevertheless participate in the application of national law through
their service on juries.”).
72 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the advocacy of AntiFederalists such as William Findley).
73 See, e.g., Rackove, supra note 11 (discussing the Framers’ view that the jury was
intended to be a protector of rights). See also HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (1981) (citing and quoting from various founding-era
writers). John Adams famously remarked that “the common people . . . should have as
complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature’ as
they have, through the legislature, in other decisions of government.” See supra note 22.
74 Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV) (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 190–93 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981).
75 Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315, 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
76 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293–94 (Phillips Bradley ed.)
(1945).
70
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that “the writings of some of the most eminent American lawyers of the
age—Jefferson, Adams, Wilson, Iredell, and Kent, to mention just a
few”—cast approval of the nullification right of juries.77 John Adams
stated that “it would be an ‛absurdity’ for jurors to be required to accept
the judge’s view of the law, ‘against their own opinion, judgment, and
conscience.’”78
Maryland delegate Luther Martin, one of the leaders of the AntiFederalist revolt that led to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, observed
that the jury trial provided a vital means of checking the tendencies in
government toward tyranny.79 Trial by jury forced the government to
bring its claims against a panel of common people before it could enforce
unjust laws, said Martin. “It would be difficult,” writes historian Saul
Cornell, “to overstate the importance of trial by jury in the minds of
Anti-Federalists like Cincinnatus [Arthur Lee] or Martin.”80 Such voices
ensured that the right to jury trial—as a true check on the power of
government and not a mere fact-finding device—would enjoy the highest
station among all of the principles of American constitutional law.
V. JURIES VERSUS JUDGES
The Framers and Founders were quite explicit that they viewed trial
by jury as necessary to thwart and obstruct judges, not merely
prosecutors with weak cases.81 Eldridge Gerry—an important Framer
and delegate to the debates in Philadelphia who later refused to sign the
Constitution because it did not contain a bill of rights82—insisted that
jury trials were necessary to guard against corrupt judges.83 Alexander
Hamilton echoed this concern in Federalist No. 83, when he wrote that
“[t]he strongest argument in its [trial by jury’s] favour is, that it is a
security against corruption.” 84 John Adams famously remarked that it
77

See Amar, supra note 1, at 101.
See Gutzman, supra note 22, at 172.
79 See Cornell, supra note 46, at 59 (discussing Martin’s emphasis on jury trials to
protect liberty).
80 Id. at 60.
81 See, e.g., the Anti-Federalist pamphlet, An Old Whig (VIII), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 46, 49 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“Judges,
unencumbered by juries, have been ever found much better friends to government than to
the people. Such judges will always be more desireable than juries to [tyrants].”).
82 See GEORGE BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY, FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN
STATESMAN (1976). Gerry—for whom the term “gerrymandering” is named—was a
signer of the Articles of Confederation and the Declaration of Independence and served
as Vice President under Madison.
83 J. Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention, in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 587 (M. Farrand ed., 1937).
84 Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 563 (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
78
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was a juror’s duty to “find the verdict according to his own best
understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct opposition to
the direction of the court.”85 One of the most articulate voices among the
Anti-Federalists during the ratification period—the Federal Farmer86—
noted that the jury trial provisions of the proposed bill of rights were
intended to “secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul
[sic] in the judicial department.”87
But if jurors were intended to control the “judicial department,” the
subsequent two centuries of jurisprudence have effectively divested them
of their rightful control. In most American jurisdictions today, judges
instruct juries that that they are required to follow the judge’s
interpretation of the law and “must find the defendant guilty” if the
prosecution proves its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.88 Many
85 Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 957
n.358 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of
Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 605 (1939) (quoting 2 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 253-55 (C.F. Adams ed., 1856))).
86 “The Federal Farmer” was the pseudonym of an Anti-Federalist writer who
authored two influential pamphlets during the ratification period. His criticisms can be
said to represent the most recurring complaints of the Anti-Federalists who objected to
the pre-Bill-of-Rights Constitution on grounds that it represented a consolidation of the
states into a central government and failed to explicitly lay out the natural rights and
freedoms of the people. The Federal Farmer’s identity has been debated by historians for
generations; however several scholars have suggested that he was Richard Henry Lee or
Melancton Smith. See 14 THE DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 6. (John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Gordon S.
Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 3 THE WILLIAM AND
MARY QUARTERLY 299–308 (1974).
87 Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra, note 74 at 320.
88 The federal courts are virtually uniform on the issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 219 (1st Cir. 1996) (“a district judge may not instruct the jury as
to its power to nullify”); United States v. Walling, No. 94-1175, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
18130, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190
(1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a conviction in a case in which a judge instructed jurors that
they “should” convict if the government meets its burden of proof but “must” acquit if it
does not); United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105–06 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978,
982 (8th Cir. 1983). State courts are similarly uniform; see, e.g., Mouton v. Texas, 923
S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Goetz, 532 N.E.2d 1273, 1273 (N.Y.
1988) (upholding an instruction that the jury “must” find a defendant guilty if the jury
finds that each element beyond a reasonable doubt). Some judges, perhaps self-conscious
of this improper assumption of power, use the phrase “should convict.” Jones v. City of
Little Rock, 862 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ark. 1993); Farina v. United States, 622 A.2d 50, 60
(D.C. 1993); Michigan v. Demers, 489 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Davis v.
Mississippi, 520 So. 2d 493, 494–95 (Miss. 1988); Montana v. Pease, 740 P.2d 659, 663
(Mont. 1987); State v. Haas, 596 A.2d 127, 131 (N.H. 1991) (upholding instructions that
the jury “should find the defendant guilty” if the prosecution proves all of the elements of
the crime). Pattern, or model, jury instructions in many jurisdictions also tell juries they
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judges will not even allow a defense attorney to argue for nullification
(or even to inform jurors of their power to nullify) during closing
arguments.89
This reversal of fortunes—the placement of judges’ prerogatives
above juries’ interpretations of the law—has had major impacts on the
development of American law. Today’s fabric of criminal codes is both
lengthier and more complicated than it would be if jurors were instructed
of their right to nullify inequitable laws. This is because modern
lawmakers no longer generally worry over whether their enactments can
be sold to and understood by lay jurors. The ancient maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse90 may have been workable in an era
when it was at least conceptually possible to know what the law was.
But today’s criminal and regulatory statutes—with their many sections
and subsections, their exception clauses and their complicated
application provisions—make the law a great mystery even to the most
learned legal scholars. Even the finely honed legal minds on the nation’s
highest courts regularly disagree over what the law is.91
VI. THE CHANGING ROLE OF AMERICAN JURIES
Any review of the historical record illustrates that the courtroom
practice that prevailed before, during, and for generations after the
founding of the United States allowed jurors to be informed of their
power to defy legislatures, prosecutors and judges by acquitting
defendants who were factually “guilty.”92 This begs the question: when
are not to question a judge’s interpretation of the law. See, e.g., New York State Office
of Court Administration, Criminal Jury Instructions New York (2d ed. 1995-2001),
http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/5-SampleCharges/SampleCharges.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2011) (providing language in the New York Model Jury Instructions which states that a
trial jury “must” convict a defendant if all the elements are proven beyond a reasonable
doubt).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 236 n.6 (6th Cir. 1995); Illinois v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 109–10,
662 N.E.2d 1215, 1231–32 (Ill. 1996); People v. Weinberg, 631 N.E.2d 97, 100 (N.Y.
1994); State v. Bjerkaas, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
90 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (noting the “venerable
principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge”).
91 For a fascinating overview of the internal disagreements and politics among judges
on the Supreme Court, see Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition
Formation and Case Outcome Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2009).
92 The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 173–
74 (1964) (“There is much evidence of the general acceptance of this principle in the
period immediately after the Constitution was adopted.” “During the first third of the
nineteenth century . . . judges frequently charged juries that they were the judges of law
as well as the fact and were not bound by the judge’s instructions . . . . [C]ounsel had the
right to argue the law—its interpretation and its validity—to the jury.”); see also
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
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and where did the notion that juries may be restricted to deciding only
issues of fact originate? Amar cites the 1851 case of United States v.
Morris,93 in which the Federal Circuit Court of the District of
Massachusetts prevented counsel from arguing the constitutionality of a
statute to a jury on the ground that the jury had no right to decide law.94
Clayton Conrad cites the 1843 New Hampshire case of Pierce v. State95
as the first recorded case upholding the denial of a jury to openly
determine the law.96 A Massachusetts decision limiting the rights of
juries in 1845 closely followed upon the heels of Pierce.97
It is evident from reading the writings of lawyers, judges, and
commentators contemporary to the founding period, however, that the
conceptual framework for the change was established well before the end
of the eighteenth century.98 Jack Rackove states that by the mid-1700s,
“a movement to restrict the law-finding power of juries and enlarge that
of judges was well under way in England,” and Americans were well
aware and contemptuous of that movement.99 When John Adams wrote
a rough draft of an essay on juries in his diary on February 12, 1771, he
indicated that he was beginning to hear “[d]octrines, advanced for law,
which if true, would render Juries a mere Ostentation and Pageantry and
the Court absolute Judges of Law and Fact.”100
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story began undermining (or at least
criticizing) the power of juries to determine the law while sitting as a

LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 3 (1975) (“juries rather than
judges regularly decided the law” in the early colonies and in the first two generations of
the United States”); JOSEPH TOWERS, Observations on the Rights and Duty of Juries, in
TRIALS FOR LIBELS 32–33 (1785) (“English juries have been in possession, time
immemorial, of the right of giving a general verdict, of determining both the law and the
fact, in every criminal case brought before them”). James Wilson, the leading legal
theoretician of the constitutional debates and one of six original justices appointed by
George Washington to the Supreme Court, regarded jurors as “the ultimate interpreters of
the law.” 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 541 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
Wilson authored his famous Lectures on Law in 1791—the very year the Bill of Rights
was ratified. Lectures on Law was the most authoritative source of legal interpretation
contemporary to the Founding period.
93 United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331–36 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
94 Amar, supra note 1, at 342 n.65.
95 Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536 (1843).
96 CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 69 (1998).
97 See Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263 (Mass. 1845).
98 See, e.g., Towers, supra note 61 (discussing and criticizing the notion (which must
have been raised by others of the period) that judges and not juries should be the sole
deciders of the law).
99 See Rackove, supra note 11, at 298 (adding that judges who advocate the
restriction of juries “had few admirers in America”).
100 Id. at 301.
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trial judge in a federal circuit case as early as 1835.101 Debate on the
topic flourished during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This was
the period when formal lawyers’ bar associations were ascendant, and
the practice of law was slowly transforming from a domain of laypersons
and informal apprenticeships into a profession dominated by formallyeducated attorneys.102
There is a wise aphorism that hard cases make bad law.103 And like
many other jurisprudential trends against Americans’ liberties, the
gradual loss of Americans’ right to have juries of common people review
the enactments and predations of the state occurred through a series of
close votes, split decisions and accidents of legal history.104 In 1894,
three murder defendants named Herman Sparf, Hans Hansen, and
Thomas St. Clair stood trial in the U.S. District of Northern California
for the bloody murder of a fellow mariner on the high seas. St. Clair
seemed to have been the actual hatchet man, as a bloody hatchet was
found beneath his bunk.105
In June 1893, St. Clair was tried separately from the other two men.
He sought “but one” jury instruction, an instruction on the law of
manslaughter.106 However, St. Clair had been indicted for capital
murder, and the trial judge refused to sanction a manslaughter
instruction.107 A jury convicted St. Clair of murder and he was sentenced
to death.108 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Harlan turned
away St. Clair’s appeal on the grounds that “[t]he indictment contained
but one charge, that of murder.”109 “[W]hile the jury had the physical
101 See United States v. Battiste, 24 F.Cas. 1042 (Mass. 1835) (reprinting Justice
Story’s instructions to a jury suggesting that “the jury are no more judges of the law in a
capital case or other criminal case . . . than they are in every civil case”). Conrad, supra
note 96, at 65–67 (discussing in some detail the background of Justice Story’s
instructions in Battiste).
102 The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 180,
n.63 (1964).
103 See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.
dissenting) (repeating the ancient saying).
104 Justice Holmes’ comments are worth repeating:
For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend.
Id. at 400–01.
105 See St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894).
106 Id. at 144 (1894).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 184.
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power to find him guilty of some lesser crime,” concluded Justice
Harlan, “[t]he verdict of ‘Guilty’ in this case will be interpreted as
The
referring to the single offense specified in the indictment.”110
decision upholding St. Clair’s conviction and death sentence was issued
in May 1894. There were no dissents.111
On the heels of the St. Clair trial, Sparf and Hansen stood trial in
the same court in San Francisco, for the same offense. Knowing that St.
Clair had already received the death penalty, Hansen and Sparf beefed up
their own efforts to get the court to issue a manslaughter instruction to
the jury. The trial judge refused a request by the defendants to instruct
the jury that “the defendants may be convicted of murder, or
manslaughter, or of an attempt to commit murder or manslaughter,”112 on
grounds that the evidence did not suggest such an instruction.113 Later
requests by the jury for clarification prompted the trial judge to repeat
that the evidence gave rise to verdicts of either guilty or not guilty of
murder only.114 The jury convicted both men of murder.115
The Sparf and Hansen verdicts were problematic on several levels,
not the least of which was the trial judge’s instruction to the jury
regarding determinations of facts (i.e., what “the evidence” supposedly
suggested). One cannot but conclude that the summary treatment of St.
Clair only weeks earlier played upon the minds of both the trial judge
and the members of the Supreme Court who considered the fate of Sparf
and Hansen. This time, issues of jury prerogatives were emphasized in
the briefs to the Supreme Court. And this time, the issue prompted an
intense disagreement among the Justices. It appears that a vigorous
effort was launched by Justices Gray and Shiras to overturn Sparf’s and
Hansen’s convictions and perhaps even the St. Clair decision of seven
months before.116 “Some of the members of this court, after much
consideration and upon an extended review of the authorities,” wrote
Justice Harlan for the winning plurality, “are of opinion that the
conclusion reached by this court is erroneous.”117

110

Id.
St. Clair, 154 U.S. at 184.
112 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 59 (1895).
113 Id. at 62.
114 Id. at 61, n.1.
115 Id.
116 The St. Clair trial occurred in June 1893 and its judgment was upheld by the
Supreme Court on May 26, 1894. See St. Clair, 154 U.S. 134. The Sparf decision was
rendered by the Supreme Court on January 21, 1895. See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 59.
117 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64.
111
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But Harlan’s four-justice plurality won the day, with the assistance
of Justice Jackson’s mostly unexplained concurrence vote.118 The
opinion that Justice Harlan authored bobbed and weaved through a
fictional fabric of legal history, offering dicta that went far beyond the
determination of the issues Sparf and Hansen presented. Having already
ruled that the same trial court was excused for its heavy-handedness in
the St. Clair trial, the Sparf quartet expounded on matters of
constitutional theory and design. Much of what Harlan wrote was pure
dicta, as the case could have been sustained based on existing precedents
upholding judges’ refusals to instruct juries regarding lesser-included
offenses.119 But the plurality suggested that a strict line between judges
and juries regarding issues of law and fact had always been universally
recognized.120 The plurality suggested that much precedent regarding the
rights of jurors was mistaken,121 that previous judges had not meant what
they said, and that decades of case law on the subject had been otherwise
misinterpreted.122 “A verdict of guilty of an offense less than the one
charged would have been in flagrant disregard of all the proof, and in
violation by the jury of their obligation to render a true verdict.”123
Justice Jackson’s concurrence stated only that Jackson “concurs in
the views herein expressed,” and that the judgment of the lower court “is
reversed as to Sparf, with directions for a new trial as to him.”124 Justices
Brewer and Brown dissented on grounds that certain confessions had
been properly entered against Sparf.125 Justices Gray and Shiras dissented
with a competing overview of the glorious history of jury nullification of
unjust laws and the traditional judicial instructions that juries had such
prerogatives.126 The confusing collection of opinions meant that Sparf’s
118

Id. at 107 (Jackson, J., concurring).
The Sparf plurality discussed these precedents at length, see id. at 103–05, but
went far beyond them.
120 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 84.
121 Justice Harlan repeated with favor a claim by Justice Field in United States v.
Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1863), that “[t]here prevails a very general, but
an erroneous, opinion that in all criminal cases the jury are the judges as well of the law
as of the fact . . . .” Sparf, 156 U.S. at 78.
122 For example, the plurality dissects Chief Justice John Jay’s jury instruction in
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (discussed supra) by suggesting it may have
been misreported, noting “the different parts of the charge conflict with each other.”
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 65.
123 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 63–64.
124 Id. at 107 (Jackson, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 107 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I concur in the views expressed in the opinion
of the court as to the separate functions of court and jury, and in the judgment of
affirmance against Hansen; but I do not concur in holding that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of confessions, or in the judgment of reversal as to Sparf”).
126 Id. at 110–82 (Gray, J., dissenting).
119
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conviction was overturned; he was retried and acquitted in 1895.127
Hansen and St. Clair were hanged at San Quentin on October 18,
1895.128
The Sparf case hardly stands for the proposition that judges need
not instruct juries of their power to render a verdict against the evidence;
in fact, the trial judge did tell the jury that it had such power.129 At most,
Sparf can be said to stand for the proposition that a judge may tell a jury
that in his own opinion, a verdict should confine itself to either guilty or
not guilty to the charge under consideration. But there were those
dozens of pages of dicta on the dichotomies and distinctions between law
and fact and judge and jury.130 For generations afterward, judges have
cited this four-vote opinion131 as support for the proposition that judges
are not required to inform jurors of their power to judge both the law and
the facts.
Some scholars and judges have even declared that the Sparf
decision settled the supposed rule mandating that juries be deceived (or
at least allowing them to be deceived).132 Yet jury instruction practices
continue to vary widely from place to place,133 and some judges are

127

Evidence Against St. Clair, S.F. CALL, Aug. 30, 1895, p. 4, Col. 1.
Hanged For Murder on the High Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1895.
129 The trial judge had in fact instructed the jury that “it may be in the power of the
jury, under the indictment by which these defendants are accused and tried, of finding
them guilty of a less crime than murder, to wit, manslaughter, or an attempt to commit
murder; yet, as I have said in this case, if a felonious homicide has been committed at all,
of which I repeat you are the judges, there is nothing to reduce it below the grade of
murder.” Sparf, 156 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added).
130 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 80.
131 Depending on one’s interpretation, it may be said that the role-of-the-jury
discussion by Justice Harlan represented the views of his own plurality plus those of
Justices Jackson, Brewer, and Brown. However, the awkward separations of the opinions
in Sparf do not make this clear. Harlan’s opinion was not pared into separate sections on
the different issues of law, and Brewer’s and Brown’s opinion was designated a dissent
rather than a partial concurrence and partial dissent.
132 Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role of the Jury, 42
AKRON L. REV. 931, 935 (2009) (“the Supreme Court settled the question more than 100
years ago [in Sparf] by holding that a criminal jury has the power, but not the right, to
acquit against the law”); Ran Zev Schijanovich, The Second Circuit’s Attack On Jury
Nullification In United States v. Thomas: In Disregard of the Law and the Evidence, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1275, (1999) (explaining that “[t]he battle line in the jury nullification
debate in federal criminal cases had been clearly drawn and stable for the last 100 years”
after Sparf); id. at 1324 n.2 (“In 1895 the United States Supreme Court in Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), put to rest any doubts that in federal criminal cases it is the
province of the court to state what the law is and that the jury’s duty is confined to
applying the facts to the law.”).
133 In practice, judges exercise wide latitude and in many jurisdictions openly tolerate
nullification arguments made to juries by defense attorneys. Johnny Cochran’s closing
arguments in the 1995 O.J. Simpson murder trial, for example, contained explicit
128
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known to give radically differing jury instructions when compared to
fellow judges down the hallways in the same courthouses.134 Indeed,
some judges refuse to instruct jurors regarding their nullification
powers.135 The issue and its many variants recurs often in state and
federal litigation.136
In 1972, The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the
issue anew in a thirty-six-page split decision in United States v.
Dougherty.137 Circuit Judges Leventhal and Adams voted not to overturn
a conviction gained after a jury was not informed of its power to acquit
against the evidence.138 Chief Judge Bazelon, one of the most influential
federal judges in the country at the time, issued a strong dissent in favor
of fully informing jurors.139 For forty years, the Dougherty split decision
has reigned as something of the last word on the subject. More than 300
other court opinions have cited the case since 1972.140
statements to the jury about the jury’s power to punish police misconduct by acquitting
Simpson:
This is what this is about. That is why we love what we do, an opportunity
to come before people from the community, the consciences of the
community. You are the consciences of the community. You set the
standards. You tell us what is right and wrong. You set the standards. You
use your common sense to do that.
Who then polices the Police? You . . . police the Police. You police them by
your verdict. You are the ones to send the message. Nobody else is going to
do it in this society. They don’t have the courage. Nobody has the courage.
They have a bunch of people running around with no courage to do what is
right, except individual citizens. You . . . are the ones in war, you are the
ones who are on the front line.
These people set policies, these people talk all this stuff; you implement it.
You are the people. You are what makes America great, and don’t you
forget it.
John T. Reed, Penn, Zenger, and O.J.: Jury Nullification—Justice or the “Wacko
Fringe’s” Attempt to Further Its Anti-Government Agenda?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1125, 1125
(1996) (quoting People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995), Reporter’s
Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 28, 1995, Vol. 232, at 47793–8036, 9:01 a.m., available
in LEXIS, Cal library, OJTRAN file).
134 See, e.g., Honorable Judge Frederic Block, Reflections on Guns and Jury
Nullification, CHAMPION MAGAZINE, July 2009, at 12 (discussing the differing
instructions he gives compared to those given by his fellow District Judge Jack
Weinstein).
135 See id. (discussing Judge Weinstein’s tendency not to inform jurors of their
nullification options).
136 See, e.g., Teresa L. Conaway, Carol L. Mutz & Joann M. Ross, Jury Nullification:
A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 393 (2004) (outlining the
massive commentary and jurisprudence on the topic).
137 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 According to the LexisNexis Academic search engine, 333 separate decisions have
referenced the Dougherty case since 1972 (Dec. 3, 2011).
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But the law is not nearly as settled in the minds of most legal
commentators as it is suggested to be among some of the nation’s judges.
Indeed, the supposed judicial antipathy against fully informed juries
finds only modest support in contemporary scholarly literature.
American legal scholarship overwhelmingly supports the right (or
“power”) of juries to issue so-called nullification verdicts.
Of
approximately 100 published scholarly articles dedicated to the topic
over the past decades, at least 80 argue that juries should be fully
informed of their powers or that jury nullification verdicts contradicting
the instructions of judges are generally beneficial to American society.141
Only a couple dozen legal scholars over the decades have authored
detailed articles in support of the current regime of jury
disinformation.142 Many of those are aligned with the prosecution bar
and the “tough on crime” judiciary. But a number of judges have written
in favor of jury nullification and fully informed juries.143 Even more
significantly, it seems that every full-length book that has ever been
authored on the subject of jury history or jury practices has favored fully
informed juries.144
141 An exhausting (but not exhaustive) compilation of articles is available in Teresa
Conaway, Carol Mutz, and Joann Ross, Survey: Jury Nullification: A Selective,
Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 393 (2004); infra, Appendix A. These
scholarly articles seem (from my own imperfect interpretation of the authors’
descriptions) to generally agree that jury independence or nullification is a beneficial,
lawful, commendable, or laudable feature of jury trials in at least some cases. The
articles come to differing conclusions regarding how jury nullification applies or should
apply but conclude that jury nullification is a legitimate component of trial by jury,
consistent with the Constitution’s original intent. Other articles might be described as
neutral on these issues. See infra, Appendix B. Many of the sources in all three
appendices to this articles were located in Teresa Conaway, Carol Mutz, and Joann Ross,
Survey: Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 393
(2004), but I have added some sources which were published since 2004.
142 See infra, Appendix C.
143 See, e.g., Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury:
Sparf and Hansen v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353 (2004);
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury ‘Nullification’: When May and Should a
Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239 (1993) (arguing that some
jury nullification stems from idealism that is “good for the American soul”); Honorable
Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, 81 JUDICATURE 169
(1998) (saying nullifying juries do so to be fair, not because of disaffection with
established law); Honorable Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law:
Constitutional Entitlement Versus Judicial Interpretation, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1999)
(celebrating Indiana’s history of jury nullification).
144 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994); CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A
DOCTRINE (1998); WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001);
GODFREY LEHMAN, IS THIS ANY WAY TO RUN A JURY? (2001); NORMAN J. FINKEL,
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995); THOMAS ANDREW GREEN,
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Today, the Supreme Court routinely authors grand pronouncements
of the glories and benefits of jury trial. Yet, these invocations of jury
trial as an “inestimable safeguard”145 against “judicial despotism,”146
“corrupt overzealous prosecutor[s],” and “a spirit of oppression and
tyranny on the part of rulers”147 are belied by the Court’s acquiescence to
widespread court practices that purport to limit juries to questions of fact
only. Review of facts, of course, rarely produces any fundamental
obstacle or check upon the actions of government, and it does not
“safeguard” security or “prevent oppression” to the degree suggested by
such judicial pronouncements. Additionally, the theft of the jury’s
traditional right to review all questions of law and fact in criminal cases
is rarely reconciled with certain Justices’ repeated claim that they apply
“originalist” approaches to construction of the Constitution’s jury-trial
provisions.148
VII. THE PROBLEM OF JURIES DECEIVED
While no scholar could argue that juries are without power to
nullify laws and acquit factually “guilty” criminal defendants, many
judges and prosecutors argue that juries have no right to be informed of
their power.149 Thus, attempts to suppress jury nullification invariably
VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY, 1200–1800 (1985); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO
DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973); GODFREY D.
LEHMAN, WE THE JURY: THE IMPACT OF JURORS ON OUR BASIC FREEDOMS (1997);
LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY (Project Gutenberg 1998) (1852).
Anyone knowing of a published scholarly book focusing solely on trial by jury or its
history which concludes that juries should be instructed that they must follow a judge’s
interpretation of the law is urged to contact the author.
145 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
146 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238 (2005) (trial by jury is necessary to
thwart “judicial despotism” that could arise from “arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions”) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 83, p. 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
147 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (“To guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,” trial by jury is the “great bulwark of [our]
civil and political liberties”) (citations omitted).
148 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the common law known to the
Framers must be consulted whenever specific questions arise from the provisions of the
Constitution. Thus, for the meaning of “trial by jury,” we are supposed to look at the
common law of 1789-1791 for specific details. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 415 n.11 (1980).
149 See, e.g., Alan W. Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 51, 55 (Autumn 1980) (saying “[t]he critical
issue in recent years has become whether the defendant has the right to have the jury
instructed as to its universally-recognized power.”); Eleanor Tavris, The Law of an
Unwritten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury Nullification, 11 W. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 98
(1983) (“Since it is an undeniable fact of judicial life that juries need explain their acts of
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take the shape of arguments that juries be uninformed or outright
misinformed about their proper station in the justice system. Some
American judges exhibit extreme hostility against juries acting as a check
on government. It might be said that jury nullification impedes judges’
natural self-interest in maintaining a de facto professional monopoly over
legal interpretation.
According to jury scholar Andrew D. Leipold, many judges
engaged in a tactical and strategic effort to expand their assumed
monopoly in the century after the 1895 Sparf decision.150 “[T]he debate
over nullification has remained surprisingly narrow,” writes Leipold.151
“Most of the discussion has centered on whether juries should be
encouraged to nullify, and in particular on whether they should be told
by the judge that they have this power.”152 “In extreme cases,” writes
Professor James Joseph Duane, “this judicial hostility even extends to
dishonesty.”153 As Chief Judge Bazelon correctly observed, current law
on this topic is tantamount to a “deliberate lack of candor.”154 In one
especially outrageous case, the jury deliberated for hours in a criminal
tax case before sending the judge a note asking what jury nullification
stood for.155 The defendant was convicted shortly after the judge falsely
told the jury that “[t]here is no such thing as valid jury nullification,” and
that they would violate their oath and the law if they did such a thing.156
Over a vigorous dissent, the Court of Appeals deemed the instruction
proper and affirmed the conviction.157
VIII. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FULLY INFORMED JURIES
The practice of deceiving jurors about their nullification powers
could not occur but for a sort of mutual understanding among some
judges that they must vigorously promote the notion that they (the
nullification to no one, the controversy exists—and rages—as to whether juries may be
properly instructed as to the existence of this power.”); Steven M. Warshawsky, Note,
Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 119,
234–35 (1996) (“The contemporary debate over jury nullification focuses . . . on whether
jurors should be informed of their nullification power at trial.”).
150 See generally Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV.
253 (1996).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional Right, 22
No. 4 LITIG. 6, 8 (1996).
154 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelou, C.J.,
dissenting).
155 United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1021–22.
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judges) should maintain a monopoly over matters of constitutional and
legal construction.158 As already discussed, however, the Framers of the
Constitution never intended such a monopoly.159 The arguments against
allowing juries to be informed of their freedom to nullify generally fall
into four categories: (1) the “chaos” argument, or the argument that
informed juries might make the law unstable or unpredictable, unlike
judges who supposedly do not,160 (2) the claim that juries should not be
“mini-legislatures” and be allowed to disturb the sound and wise
enactments of learned lawmakers,161 (3) the claim that professional
lawyers and judges know better the meanings of constitutions and laws
than common people on juries, and (4) the argument that perceptive
jurors already know about jury power or can figure it out during jury
trials, and thus they need no instruction on the topic.162
The claim that fully informed juries would bring chaos to the law
is, of course, inconsistent with known history. Indeed, it is arguable that
courts and the imposition of laws have never been more chaotic than they
are right now.163 Oprah Winfrey was, after all, forced to face trial for

158 See Duane, supra note 153, at 10 (describing the “widespread myth popular among
judges” that the law “requires juries to convict every man shown to be technically guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
159 See supra notes 150–157 and accompanying text. Consider also the observation of
James Wilson, one of the eminent Framers of America’s Founding documents. “[E]very
one who is called to act, has a right to judge” the constitutionality of acts and actions of
government, wrote Wilson. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 186 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967).
160 United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991) (“anarchy would
result from instructing the jury that it may ignore the requirements of the law”).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“To
assign the role of mini-legislature to the various petit juries, who must hang if not
unanimous, exposes criminal law and administration to paralysis, and to a deadlock that
betrays rather than furthers the assumptions of viable democracy.”).
162 This was the crux of the two-judge majority’s holding in Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113. For years, this argument has been a mainstay of anti-informed-jury advocates.
163 Numerous books in recent years have exposed the capricious and selective nature
of modern criminal law. See, e.g., GENE HEALY, GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (2007) (discussing various examples of how
the criminal laws have become unknowable and unpredictable); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008) (addressing the increasing size, scope and randomness of
modern criminal law); ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT BREAKS ITS OWN LAWS (2004) (describing the erosion
of natural rights by the imposition of increasingly pervasive government criminal laws);
PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD INTENTIONS:
HOW PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ARE TRAMPLING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
NAME OF JUSTICE (2008) (describing how instrumentalism among the three branches of
government has eroded the rule of law); HARVEY SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY:
HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009) (suggesting an average American
unknowingly commits three felonies a day).
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defaming hamburgers in 1996.164 Schoolchildren have been arrested and
criminally prosecuted in recent years for participating in food fights at
their school cafeterias,165 bringing steak knives to school to prepare
lunch,166 writing on their desks,167 and farting in class.168 A 12-year-old
boy was recently arrested and taken into custody for opening a Christmas
present too early.169 Four Americans were imprisoned (three for eight
years) during the 1990s for innocently importing lobster tails in plastic
bags instead of boxes in violation of a complicated federal statute.170 A
70-year-old woman was jailed in Orem, Utah for having a brown lawn.171
One could easily fill volumes with accounts of similarly selective, trivial,
and capricious arrests and prosecutions over the past few years. The loss
of the jury as an effective check on the power of the state has wrought a
criminal justice system that is subject to few controls and bears little
accountability.
Today’s police and prosecutors have much more power than the
Framers of the Constitution could have ever predicted.172 They
arbitrarily can pursue—or not pursue—any American they select, based
on virtually unreviewable criteria. Rewards and punishments in the
criminal justice system are handed out utterly haphazardly, mostly in
164 See JEROME POHLEN, ODDBALL TEXAS: A GUIDE TO SOME REALLY STRANGE
PLACES 6 (2006) (discussing the case and the impact on Oprah Winfrey); David J.
Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional Twilight
Zone, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 191 (1998) (discussing the Oprah Winfrey case in the context
of a general discussion of the “constitutional twilight zone” of so-called food
disparagement statutes).
165 See Matt Bartosik, Kids Arrested for Food Fight, NBC CHICAGO (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/Kids-Arrested-for-Food-Fight69575092.html.
166 See Knife at Lunch Gets 10-Year-Old Girl Arrested at School, WFTV.COM (Dec.
14, 2007), http://www.wftv.com/news/14858405/detail.html.
167 See Desk Doodling Arrest: Alexa Gonzalez, 12-Year-Old, Handcuffed for Drawing
POST
(Feb.
5,
2010),
on
School
Desk,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/05/desk-doodling-arrest-alex_n_450859.html.
168 See Zach Smith, Report: Martin County student arrested for passing gas, turning
(Nov.
21,
2008),
off
classmate’s
computer,
TCPALM
http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2008/nov/21/report-martin-county-student-arrestedpassing-gas-/.
169 See Angie Goff, Boy Booked for Opening Christmas Present, WIS NEWS 10 (Oct.
6, 2006), http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5774586&nav=0RaPXRrw.
170 See
Rough Justice, THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16640389.
171 See Sara Israelsen, Defense Grows in Orem Lawn Case, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 19,
2007),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695211283/Defense-grows-in-Orem-lawncase.html.
172 See, e.g., Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685
(2001) (stating the original intent of the Constitution assumed a small and mostly
privately-staffed criminal justice system).
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accordance with perceived loyalty to the state.173 The primary problems
associated with contemporary American criminal justice are overlegislation, overuse of plea-bargaining, mass incarceration, and the
growing threat of wrongful conviction. Each of these problems would
surely fade if juries were more consistently informed of their lawful role
as government spoilers in the court system.
The claim that juries are not supposed to act as “mini-legislatures”
or to review the wise statutes of legislators has two answers. First, it is
false, as the Framers of the Constitution intended juries to function as
“mini-legislatures” in some cases.174 As already discussed, the right to
jury trial in criminal cases was placed in Article III of the Constitution as
the most important limitation upon the federal judiciary. Various
Framers indicated that this placement was designed to shape the Judicial
Branch into something of a two-tiered structure akin to the twochambered structure of the Legislative Branch.175 Voices of the
Founding Period indicated that juries were to “function like a sitting
constitutional convention.”176 Jefferson’s famous quote that he
“consider[ed] [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet imagined by
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution” reveals the prevalent view among the Founders that juries
were to share powers of constitutional interpretation with judges.177
Second, the sea of statutes and rules the legislative branches of
modern American jurisdictions (and sometimes by the executive
branches) generate is hardly worthy of such deference. One could easily
fill volumes with accounts of the imposition of oppressive, silly, and
stupid laws over the past century.178 New Jersey still prohibits self173 One of the more depressing articles I have read on the growth of the American
police and prosecution state is Craig Horowitz, The Defense Rests—Permanently, NEW
YORK
MAGAZINE
(Mar.
4,
2002),
available
at
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/crimelaw/features/5730/.
This depressing article
describes a criminal justice system that has become so lopsided in favor of the state that
its results are wholly disproportionate, unfair, and almost random. Many criminal
defense lawyers, the article suggests, are leaving the filed of criminal defense entirely due
to the system’s lopsidedness.
174 See Amar II, supra note 33 (discussing the commonly held view among the
Framers that jury trial was as much of a right of jurors—representing the community—as
it was a right of defendants).
175 See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
176 SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 134 (1999) (discussing the arguments of
Anti-Federalist William Findley of Pennsylvania).
177 Jefferson was writing to Tom Paine in 1789, recommending that France adopt trial
by jury. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
178 DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008) (discussing numerous
examples of silly and oppressive criminal laws); ELBERT HUBBARD & BERT HUBBARD,
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service gas stations by law.179 Many jurisdictions make it a criminal
offense for automobilists to “cruise” repeatedly through a town’s main
street.180 Lists of stupid laws are frequent fare for comedians and games
of trivia.181 It may be said that laws have increased in their levels of
stupidity and cupidity as juries have become increasingly misinformed
about their constitutional powers to nullify their effects.182 Many of
today’s enactments are thousands of pages in length, and most
lawmakers do not even read them in their entirety before voting to
approve them.183 In practice, today’s statutes are written by teams of
self-interested lobbyists, who may cunningly or even deceptively salt
them with ignoble and corrupt features.184
SELECTED WRITINGS OF ELBERT HUBBARD: HIS MINTAGE OF WISDOM, COINED FROM A LIFE
OF LOVE, LAUGHTER AND WORK 199 (1922) (“Very few bad laws are ever

repealed . . . The law-books are filled with silly laws that no lawyer dare cite . . .”).
179 See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW JERSEY 295 (Maxine N. Lurie & Marc Mappen,
eds. 2004).
180 Steven N. Gofman, Car Cruising: One Generation’s Innocent Fun Becomes the
Next Generation’s Crime, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing “cruising” ordinances
nationwide).
181 Lists of stupid laws are frequently circulated on the internet and on email
discussion lists. See, e.g., www.idiotlaws.com; www.dumblaws.com.
182 See, e.g., HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET
THE INNOCENT (2009) (the increased complexity of criminal statutes now expose the
average American to prosecution for three felonies per day).
183 See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1438 (2007)
(“Members of Congress often do not read the bills on which they are asked to vote, let
alone consider the meaning of statutory terms in light of dictionary definitions and
canons of construction.”); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the
Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 45 (2004) (referring to a statutory scheme
that “is so confusing and intricate that it is nearly impossible to determine which
provisions apply to which practices”); Id. at 75 (“Commentators have complained about
the limited deliberation that preceded the USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed despite
the fact that members of Congress did not have a chance to view the actual text.”).
184 See, e.g., SHERYL LINDSELL-ROBERTS & MYRON MILLER, LOONY LAWS & SILLY
STATUTES (1994) (collecting numerous nationwide examples of ludicrous and silly laws);
Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 995, 996 (2000)
(Discussing appropriations riders often attached to bills in ways that allow “only minimal
opportunity for review and assessment by congressional members outside of the
appropriations committees, let alone by members of the interested public,” in a process
that is “often shielded from public review and critique, is especially vulnerable to
manipulation by special interests.” New laws tend to grant extensive powers to
government agencies while insulating government action “from complying with
otherwise applicable legal standards. As a result, the judiciary’s role is impaired, because
reviewing courts have virtually no means to assess whether agency action taken pursuant
to a rider’s directive is arbitrary and capricious.”); see also Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty
Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or ‘Crying Wolf?’, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1327 (2000) (“It is not just their numbers that are significant.
Much of the legislation takes the form of the omnibus crime bill, which ‘can be hundreds
of pages long and contain an infinite number of provisions defining new crimes . . .’”).
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The claim that learned lawyers and judges know better the “true”
meanings of statutes and constitutions than common people, even if
accurate in a conceptual sense, violates the general rule that laws
(especially criminal laws) are to be simple and easily understood by all.
The Framers were resounding in their consensus on this proposition. The
first volume of the U.S. Reports contains a discussion by Pennsylvania
Anti-Federalist William Findley regarding the unfairness of laws being
solely construed by lawyers and judges. “[E]very man,” said Findley,
“who possessed a competent share of common sense, and understood the
rules of grammar, was able to determine on a bare perusal of the bill of
rights and constitution. With these aids, he defied all the sophistry of the
schools, and the jargon of the law . . .”185 “[I]t would be fatal indeed to
the cause of liberty,” he continued, “if it was once established, that the
technical learning of a lawyer is necessary to comprehend the principles
laid down in this great political compact between the people and their
rulers.”186
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights were pronouncements of
natural law, and each person had a right to his own interpretation. “Since
natural law was thought to be accessible to the ordinary man, the theory
invited each juror to inquire for himself whether a particular rule of law
was consonant with principles of higher law.”187 As Amar writes, the
elimination of this one stage of review eliminates an important check on
government. “[W]hoever could be obliged to obey a constitutional law,
is justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act of the legislature,”
wrote James Wilson. 188 “When a question, even of this delicate nature,
occurs, every one who is called to act, has a right to judge . . .”189
This principle, that the common citizenry rather than any
aristocracy of elites were to hold the keys to understanding and
interpreting the laws, was widely recognized among the Founding
Generation. It was propounded by Federalists as well as AntiFederalists, lawyers as well as non-lawyers. James Madison wrote in
Federalist No. 62 that “[i]t will be of little avail to the people, that the
laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous
that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be
185

Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 328–29 (1788).
Id. (citing argument of William Findley, a Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist).
187 Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 172
(1964).
188 Amar, supra note 1, at 99 (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 186 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967)). As Amar notes, Wilson’s invocation of all actors who
perform constitutional duties must surely have meant jurors as well as judges and
legislators, although Wilson “did not single out juries by name.”
189 Id.
186
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understood.”190 Accordingly, jurors were to be the arbiters of legal
meanings as much as the most learned jurists on the nation’s highest
benches. John Adams wrote in his diary in 1771 that “[t]he general
Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society, under which ordinary
Transactions arrange themselves, are well enough known to ordinary
Jurors,” as were the “great principles of the [British] Constitution.”191
Finally, there is the argument that jurors “already know” or can
figure out their powers of nullification and that, therefore, no instruction
on such matters is necessary. It was this claim upon which the 1972
Dougherty split decision in the D.C. Circuit was largely based, and the
same notion has occasionally featured in other decisions.192 The
Dougherty majority held that no instructions on nullification needed to
be given to jurors because jurors at that time could read between the lines
of various jury instructions and know they had the power to nullify.193
But as Professor Duane has pointed out, in the years since the Dougherty
split decision, jury instruction practices in most courtrooms have become
decidedly more deceptive, more punitive, and more “indefensible.”194
During the 1970s, when Dougherty was decided, the common practice
was for judges to use the word “must” only when instructing jurors to
acquit when prosecutors fail to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In contrast, the word “should” was used when instructing jurors about
their obligations when prosecutors prove their cases.195
But today, many courts have switched to using “must” in both
commands. “Contrary to the Dougherty court’s assumption about what a
criminal trial judge would ‘never’ do,” writes Professor Duane, “the
United States Judicial Conference has instructed federal judges to tell
every criminal jury that ‘if you are firmly convinced that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty.’”196 It might even

190

THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison) (Publius).
John Adams, diary entry of February 12, 1771, reprinted in Rackove, supra note
11, at 301.
192 See supra notes 137–48 and accompanying text (discussing the Dougherty
decision and the subsequent prevailing view that Dougherty represents the last word on
the topic of jury nullification in the courts).
193 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The jury
knows well enough that its prerogative is not limited to the choices articulated in the
formal instructions of the court.”).
194 Duane, supra note 153.
195 Id.
196 Id. (emphasis added) (citing the Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Jury Instructions
21 (1987)).
191
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be said that “must convict” jury instructions now prevail in the criminal
courts.197
One can scarcely imagine how juries could be further marginalized
without abolishing them altogether. Today’s juries are routinely ordered
to convict when prosecutors prove their cases, in plain violation of the
original intent of the Constitution’s Framers. Although attempts have
been made repeatedly to correct this problem through legislation,
citizens’ referenda, and court litigation, the contemporary bar and bench
has erected an increasing array of barriers to such restorative reforms.
IX. CONCLUSION
Under the Constitution’s original intent, jurors were to act as a
check against the power of government rather than as a mere fact-finding
device. All of the principal Constitutional Framers, including Madison,
Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, and others, are on record stating that juries
were meant to judge both the law and the facts in jury trials. The text of
the Constitution itself virtually mandates this construction, with its
Double Jeopardy Clause, its requirement that juries be available in “all”
criminal cases and prosecutions, and its placement of trial by jury in
criminal cases into the structural framework of the Judicial Branch as
part of a bifurcated system of justice.
America’s contemporary judges have not distinguished themselves
as protectors of the people’s liberties in the face of encroachments by the
political branches of government. To this day, the United States
Supreme Court has struck down as unconstitutional only approximately
150 federal statutes.198 As laws have multiplied and the predations of
government lawyers have become more ambitious, courts have failed to
erect material legal barriers to America’s growing prison and police
state. Never before have so many Americans faced the threat of prison
for technical violations of so many nearly incomprehensible laws, and
never have fully informed juries been more necessary.199

197 Several courts have formally approved similar instructions telling the jury they
“must” convict. See Farina v. United States, 622 A.2d 50, 61 (D.C. 1993); People v.
Bernhard Goetz, 532 N.E.2d 1273 (N.Y. 1988); see also United States v. Fuentes, 57
F.3d 1061 (1st Cir. 1995) (telling a jury they “must” convict is not plain error); Miller v.
Georgia, 391 S.E.2d 642, 647 (Ga. 1990) (permissible to tell jury their verdict “would be
guilty” if they found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
198 See Legislation Declared Unconstitutional, in CONGRESS A TO Z THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (D.R. Tarr & A. O’Connor eds., 2003).
199 For books detailing the terrifying growth of America’s contemporary police and
prosecution empire, see HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS
TARGET THE INNOCENT (1st ed. 2009) (suggesting an average American unknowingly
commits three felonies a day); CATO INSTITUTE, GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE
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APPENDIX A
The following scholarly articles seem to generally agree that jury
independence or nullification is a beneficial, lawful, commendable, or
laudable feature of jury trials in at least some cases. The articles come to
differing conclusions regarding how jury nullification applies or should
apply but conclude that jury nullification is a legitimate component of
trial by jury, consistent with the Constitution’s original intent. R. Jack
Ayres, Jr., Judicial Nullification of the Right to Trial by Jury by
“Evolving” Standards of Appellate Review, 60 Baylor L. Rev. 337 (2008)
(indicating that modern practice defies original understandings of trial by
jury); Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription
for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U.L. Rev.
2223 (2010); Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or
Fictions?, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386 (1954) (indicating that jury
nullification helps inject an element of community sentiment into the
courts); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 1149 (1997) (arguing jury nullification is consistent with
the rule of law); Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2381 (1999) (arguing the benefits of jury nullification
outweigh the risks); Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification as a Defense
Strategy, 2 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 1 (1995) (saying defense attorneys
should aggressively seek nullification when clients are morally
blameless); James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret
Constitutional Right, 22 No. 4 Litig. 6 (Summer 1996) (saying none of
the arguments against jury nullification instructions hold up to
examination and that judicial efforts to conceal the right of jury
nullification cause judges to lose credibility); David Farnham, Jury
Nullification: History Proves It’s Not a New Idea, Crim. Just., Winter
1997, at 4–14 (arguing that denying jury nullification instructions causes
more harm than benefits); Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice,
Culpability, and Punishment, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 669 (2000) (contending
that jury nullification helps make the application of the law reasonable,
thereby thwarting anarchy); W. Russel Gray, Supralegal Justice: Are
Real Juries Acting Like Fictional Detectives?, 21 J. Am. Culture 1 (1998)
(suggesting juries that nullify oppressive laws are like the heroes of
popular fiction); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of
the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 377 (1999) (recounting the jury’s
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2006) (detailing the
increasing ambiguity in criminal statutes).
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gradual loss of its law-making function); W. William Hodes, Lord
Broughham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind,
67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1075 (1996) (discussing various occasions in which
jury nullification may be appropriate); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as
Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582 (1939) (recounting the
long history of jury nullification); Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or
Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of Jury
Nullification, 14 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 145 (2004) (justifying jury
nullification on economic grounds); Kieth E. Niedermeier, et al.,
Informing Jurors of Their Nullification Power: A Route to a Just Verdict
or Judicial Chaos?, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 331 (1999) (saying
nullification occurs when jurors seek to avoid unjust verdicts); Major
Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the
Bench and Bar, 173 Mil. L. Rev. 68 (2002) (advocating allowing military
counsel to argue for nullification); Travis Hreno, Necessity and Jury
Nullification, 20 Can. J.L. & Juris. 351 (2007) (indicating jury
nullification may be appropriate in cases where defendant acted without
guilty conscience); Frank A. Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation
and the Power of Jury Nullification, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 269 (1978)
(arguing that judicial candor requires juries be fully informed of their
powers); Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Korroch & Major Michael J.
Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation to
Anarchy?, 139 Mil. L. Rev. 131 (1993) (advocating that proper
instructions indicating jurors may judge both the law and the facts should
be available in some cases); Stephan Landsman, Of Mushrooms &
Nullifiers: Rules of Evidence and the American Jury, 21 St. Louis U.
Pub. L. Rev. 65 (2002) (arguing that juries must be fully informed);
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877
(1999) (saying nullification brings more benefits than harm); Harris G.
Mirkin, Judicial Review, Jury Review & the Right of Revolution Against
Despotism, 6 Polity 38 (1973) (suggesting that juries are an alternative to
revolution); James Ostrowski, The Rise and Fall of Jury Nullification,
15. J. of Libertar. St. 89 (2001) (arguing for more jury nullification);
Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts,
and Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 467 (2001) (saying permitting
defense to argue for a nullification verdict would be morally reasonable);
Dianah L. Pressley, Jury Nullification: The Inchoate Power, 20 Am. J.
Trial Adv. 451 (1997) (explaining developments in the area of jury
nullification); John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and O.J.: Jury
Nullification-Justice or the “Wacko Fringe’s” Attempt to Further Its
Anti-Government Agenda?, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 1125 (1996) (saying jury
nullification should be allowed); Arie M. Rubenstein, Note: Verdicts of
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Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
959 (2006) (suggesting that nullification should be recognized); Alan W.
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 168
(1972) (independent juries serve as a useful check on overzealous
prosecutions); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification:
The Contours of a Controversy, Law and Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1980, at 51 (describing the application of nullification provisions in the
Maryland and Indiana Constitutions); Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of
Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as Jury Responses to Crimes of
Conscience, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2039 (1996) (supporting nullification in
cases of conscience); Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury
Nullification, and Magna Carta, 22 Quinnipac L. Rev. 651 (2004)
(strongly supporting jury nullification); Robert J. Stolt, Note, Jury
Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 New Eng. L. Rev. 105 (1971)
(supporting nullification); Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge
and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After
Bushell’s Case, 111 Yale L.J. 1815 (2002) (saying jury fact-finding is the
inevitable result of the Bushell Case in the 1680s); Robert S. Summers,
Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judical Fact-Finding—
Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 Law & Phil.
497 (1999) (fully informed juries are justified in some cases); Jon M.
Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 Cath. Law. 224 (1970)
(justice would be best served if juries were fully informed); David C.
Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct
the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 89 (1995)
(arguing judges should inform juries of their powers); M. Kristine
Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative
Developments, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1101 (1993) (offering a model
jury instruction on jury law-finding); David N. Dorfman & Chris K.
Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New
Context, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 861 (1995) (saying jury law-finding
empowers estranged communities); Robert T. Hall, Legal Toleration of
Civil Disobedience, 81 Ethics 128 (1971) (arguing that jury nullification
serves several important social functions); Andrew D. Leipold,
Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253, 257. (1996) (arguing
for legislative enactments of fully informed jury laws); R. Alex Morgan,
Note, Jury Nullification Should Be Made a Routine Part of the Criminal
Justice System, but It Won’t Be, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1127 (1997) (saying
fully informed juries should be a routine component of the justice
system); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s
Different Voice, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1377 (1994) (arguing that when juries
nullify, they give voice to community concerns that should be
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recognized); Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman’s Syndrome
Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 Am. U.
J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 141 (1995) (saying juries should be informed,
either through instructions or closing argument); Paul Butler, Racially
Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995) (arguing that black jurors should use
nullification to protect community members caught up in oppressive or
overly penal prosecutions); Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal
Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1996) (rebutting
counterarguments and asserting the propriety of jury nullification to
correct for racial oppression and discrimination); Paul Butler, By Any
Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust
Law, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 721 (2003) (arguing that jury nullification is a
useful alternative to violence in the struggle for racial equality); Clay S.
Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 7 (1997)
(dismantling claims of some opponents that racist jurors have ever
improperly acquitted violent racists); Long X. Do, Comment, Jury
Nullification and Race-Conscious Reasonable Doubt: Overlapping
Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the Potential Voir Dire
Mistake, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1843 (2000) (saying efforts by judges to rid
jury pools of potential nullifiers undermine the role of the jury); Andrew
D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response
to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 108 (1996) (supporting
nullification but arguing against the race-based approach of Professor
Paul Butler); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims
of Jury Nullification, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 285 (1999) (supporting
jury nullification); Symposium, The Role of Race-Based Jury
Nullification in American Criminal Justice, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 907
(1997) (discussing advocacy of Paul Butler and generally supporting jury
nullification in general but not in agreement on application); Steven E.
Barkan, Jury Nullification in Political Trials, 31 Soc. Probs. 28 (1983)
(arguing that jury nullification ultimately provides a stable landscape for
civil society); William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience
Cases, 10 Va. J. Int’l L. 71 (1970) (arguing that jury nullification
communicates the voice of the community and should be praised); Philip
Lynch, Juries as Communities of Resistence: Eureka and the Power of
the Rabble, 27 Alternative L.J. 83 (2002) (supporting fully informed
juries); Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. Gender
Race & Just. 337 (2002) (supporting jury nullification as a means to
attain social justice); Joseph L. Sax, Conscience & Anarchy: The
Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 Yale Rev. 481 (1968) (indicating jury
nullification is useful for justice); Brian Galle, Note, Free Exercise
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Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 569 (2001) (proposing
reforms that would provide for informed juries); Bruce McCall,
Comment, Sentencing by Death Qualified Juries and the Right to Jury
Nullification, 22 Harv. J. on Legis. 289 (1985) (says death-qualified
juries violate jury right of nullification); Frank A. Bacelli, Note, United
States v. Thomas: When the Preservation of Juror Secrecy During
Deliberations Outweighs the Ability to Dismiss a Juror for Nullification,
48 Cath. U.L. Rev. 125 (1988) (arguing judges should not dismiss
nullifying jurors); David C. Brody, Balancing Jury Secrecy and the Rule
of Law: The Second Circuit’s Guide to Removing Nullifying Jurors, 20
Just. Sys. J. 113 (1998) (arguing that United States v. Thomas sets a
dangerous precedent); James H. Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning
Prospective Jurors on Their Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 Ind. L.J.
163 (1984) (says courts should not go overboard to keep nullifying jurors
off juries); Ran Zev Schijanovich, Note, The Second Circuit’s Attack on
Jury Nullification in United States v. Thomas: In Disregard of the Law
and the Evidence, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1275 (1999) (saying U.S. v.
Thomas is an erroneous application of federal law); Steven M.
Fernandes, Comment, Jury Nullification and Tort Reform in California:
Eviscerating the Power of the Civil Jury by Keeping Citizens Ignorant of
the Law, 27 Sw. U.L. Rev. 99 (1997) (proposing a jury instruction to
restore fully informed juries); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86
Iowa L. Rev. 1601 (2001) (supporting nullification in civil cases);
Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries,
2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115 (2003) (indicating jury nullification has been
regrettably delegitimized); Samuel K. Dennis, Maryland’s Antique
Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. Pa. L. Rev. 34 (1943) (recounting
Maryland’s constitutional history allowing jury law-finding); Deirdre A.
Harris, Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspective: Massachusetts
as a Case Study, 12 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 968 (1978) (courts must preserve
the jury’s power to nullify); Gary J. Jacobson, The Right to Disagree:
Judges, Juries, and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland,
1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 571 (1976) (suggesting jury disagreement with
judges on the law furthers civic engagement in Maryland); Andrew J.
Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial Oligarchy” Declares
War on Jury Nullification, 46 Washburn L.J. 379 (2007); Mike Reck,
Note, A Community with No Conscience: The Further Reduction of a
Jury’s Right to Nullify in People v. Sanchez, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 285
(1999) (arguing judicial efforts to stop nullification in California go too
far); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the 19th Century, 74 Yale
L.J. 170 (1964) (recounting the history of law-finding juries);
Christopher C. Schwan, Right Up To the Line: The Ethics of Advancing

38

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:1

Nullification Arguments to the Jury, 29 J. Legal Prof. 293 (2004)
(generally praising jury nullification); Carolyn White Spenglar, Note,
The Jury’s Role Under the Indiana Constitution, 52 Ind. L.J. 793 (1977)
(examining the history of nullification in Indiana and proposing a model
for informing juries); Robert C. Black, FIJA: Monkeywrenching the
Justice System? 66 UMKC L. Rev. 11 (1997) (advocates giving juries an
instruction regarding their power); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van
Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification (Protest and
Resistance: Civil Disobedience in the 1990s), 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
165 (1991) (saying the justice system would be best served by judges
instructing jurors of their powers); David C. Brody & Craig Rivera,
Examining the Dougherty “All-Knowing Assumption”: Do Jurors Know
About Their Jury Nullification Power?, 33 Crim. L. Bull. 151 (1997)
(study disproving claim of majority in Dougherty that people already
know of jury power); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans,
Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State
Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1249 (2003)
(indicating that jury nullification is rare but reflects juror concerns with
fairness when it occurs); Jeffrey Zahler, Allowing Defendants to Present
Evidence of Prison Conditions to Convince Juries to Nullify: Can Only
the Prosecutor Present “Moral” Evidence?, 34 New Eng. J. on Crim. &
Civ. Confinement 485 (2008) (arguing that defendants should be able to
argue for conscience verdicts).
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APPENDIX B
These scholarly articles seem to take a generally neutral stance on
whether jury independence or nullification is a beneficial, lawful,
commendable, or laudable feature of jury trials, or whether jury
nullification is a legitimate component of trial by jury, consistent with
the Constitution’s original intent. Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury
Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 125 (1998) (addressing the opposing
sides of the debate). W. Neil Brooks & Anthony N. Doob, Justice & the
Jury, 31 J. Soc. Sci. 171 (1975) (examining extra-legal factors that
influence jury decisions); Leo P. Dreyer, Comment, Jury Nullification
and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 47 (1972) (discussing the competing arguments in United
States v. Dougherty); Rita Simon, Jury Nullification, or Prejudice and
Ignorance in the Marion Barry Trial, 20 J. Crim. Just. 261 (1992)
(examining recent cases); Ralph Slovenko, Jury Nullification, 22 J.
Psychol. & L. 165 (1994) (recounting the issue in the context of the Jack
Kevorkian trials); Eleanor Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law: A
Common Sense View of Jury Nullification, 11 W. St. U. L. Rev. 97 (1983)
(saying jury law-finding can cause problems); Hihoshi Fukurai, Is the
O.J. Simpson Verdict an Example of Jury Nullification?: Jury Verdicts,
Legal Concepts, and Jury Performance in a Racially Sensitive Criminal
Case, 22 Intl. J. Comp. & Appl. Crim. Just. 185 (1998) (discussing the
issue in context of the O.J. Simpson Verdict); John P. Relman,
Overcoming Obstacles to Federal Fair Housing Enforcement in the
South: A Case Study in Jury Nullification, 61 Miss. L.J. 579 (1991)
(examining jury nullification in civil trials involving race
discrimination); Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy
Making: The Role of the Jury, 39 J. Pol. 73 (1977) (asking whether jury
nullification provides appropriate community policy-making); Elizabeth
I. Haynes, Note, United States v. Thomas: Pulling the Jury Apart, 30
Conn. L. Rev. 731 (1998) (discussing court dismissal of nullifying
jurors); Noel Fidel, Preeminently a Political Institution: The Right of
Arizona Juries to Nullify the Law of Contributory Negligence, 23 Ariz.
St. L.J. 1 (1991) (discussing the issue); Erick L. Hill & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer,
Nullification Instructions and Juror Guilt Ratings: An Examination of
Modern Racism, 16 Contemp. Soc. Psychol. 6 (1992) (discussing the
issue); Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on
Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 Law & Hum. Behav.
25 (1985) (examining the impacts of jury instructions); Irwin A.
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions,
Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 Law & Hum.
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Behav. 439 (1988) (juries may be impacted by jury nullification
instructions); Irwin A. Horowitz, et al., Jury Nullification and
Psychological Perspectives, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1207 (2001) (reviewing
research); Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willgins, Changing Views of
Jury Power, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 165 (1991) (tracking the history of
the issue).
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APPENDIX C
These scholarly articles seem to take a position in support of the
current regime of jury disinformation with regard to the appropriateness
of nullification. Judge Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The AntiAtticus, 65 Ala. Law. 110 (2004) (arguing against jury nullification);
Honorable Judge Frederic Block, Reflections on Guns and Jury
Nullification, 33 Champion 12 (2009) (recognizing the persistence of
jury nullification but indicating distaste for it); Judge Lawrence W.
Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1 (1997) (claiming jury nullification threatens the integrity of the
judicial system); Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification;
Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather, a Case for Judicial Control,
67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109 (1996) (arguing that jury independence is akin
to anarchy); Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case
Matter?, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 49 (Winter 1997) (writing that jury
nullification undermines the justice system); David A. Pepper, Nullifying
History: Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 50 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 599 (2000) (arguing that jury nullification is not a right but a
power that should not be used); Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An
Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. Va. L. Rev. 389
(1988) (saying jury nullification is a de facto and improper route to
political change); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American
System: A Skeptical View, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 488 (1976) (arguing against
jury independence); Richard St. John, License to Nullify: The
Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury
Lawmaking, 106 Yale L.J. 2563 (1997) (arguing jury independence is
illegitimate); Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification:
Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.J. 119 (1996)
(arguing against fully informed juries); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note,
Jury Nullification and Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825
(1990) (arguing juries should not be fully informed); Nancy J. King,
Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433 (1998) (arguing for the arrest and
prosecution of street advocates of fully-informed juries); Elissa Krauss &
Martha Schulman, The Myth of Black Juror Nullification: Racism
Dressed Up in Jurisprudential Clothing, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 57
(1997) (decrying as unethical or immoral Paul Butler’s arguments for
nullification); Susie Cho, Comment, Capital Confusion: The Effect of
Jury Instructions on the Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 532 (1994) (concluding that jurors must follow instructions
on the law); Patrick M. Pericak, Casenote, Using Rule 23(b) as a Means
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of Preventing Juror Nullification, 23 S. Ill. U.L.J. 173 (1998) (arguing
that jurors who seem like they may challenge a law should be removed);
John F. Bodle, Note, Indiana Juries in Criminal Cases as Judges of Law
Under Constitutional Relic, 24 Notre Dame L. Rev. 365 (1948) (saying
fully informed juries are dangerous); Honorable Oliver A. Harker, The
Illinois Juror in the Trial of Criminal Cases, 5 Ill. L. Rev. 468 (1911)
(Illinois’ constitutional provision making juries the judges of law and
fact in criminal cases and suggesting the provision is dangerous); Erick J.
Haynie, Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The “Fully
Informed” Jury Movement and Its Implications, 88 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 343 (1997) (calling for the arrest and prosecution of those
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